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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
argues that only the entire class of creditors could bring the action. In that
case, which involved a statute making the responsible directors liable to all
corporate creditors for any unsecured debts in excess of the paid in capital,7
it was held that this was in the nature of secondary liability which could only
be restored to after their remedies against the corporation had been exhausted
and then only by all the creditors in a class action.
The Court of Appeals correctly distinguished the National Bank of Auburn
case on the ground, that, ". . . [the purpose of the statute was] to cure im-
pairments of the corporations financial worth ... by providing a fund for re-
imbursement of all creditors."18 In other words, making unsecured loans in
excess of the paid in capital was not forbidden. On the other hand, "Section 59
of the Stock Corporation Law is clearly intended to be penal." 9 No loan is to
be made in any event to stockholders, (moneyed corporations excluded) and
if one is made the directors are to be penalized.
The Court of Appeals held, "Under the circumstances here, we could not,
without materially distracting from the effectiveness of the remedy, decline to
recognize plaintiff's right to sue."; 1o since, to do so, would require the plaintiff
to locate and join all the other corporate creditors in a new action. This con-
clusion is in harmony with the lower court cases and is clearly calculated to
carry out the intent of the Section, namely the absolute prohibition of loans to
stockholders. The Court seems to have met squarely the defendant's claim
that it is inequitable to allow the plaintiff exclusive recovery here by pointing
out that other creditors could have intervened (Civil Practice Act Section
193-6), and that the defendant had a right to move for joinder (Rules of
Civil Practice, Rule 102).
The other issue raised by the defendant had to do with the reading of the
statute. The defendant urged that the first clause prohibiting the loans to
stockholder was to be modified by the final phrase "to enable any stockholder
to withdraw any part of the money paid in by him on his stock." Looking at
the prior judicial interpretation of Section 59,"1 and the Attorney General's
report on the legislative history of the Section,' 2 the Court decided there was
no validity to this contention, because it was clear that the legislative intent
was an unconditional prohibition on moneyed loans to stockholders.
LIMITATION PERIOD APPLICABLE TO AN ACTION FOR ACCOUNTING UNDER SEC-
TioN 106 oF STOCK C01PORATION LAW
The Baldwin Trading Corporation was dissolved in 1939 for nonpayment
of its franchise tax, pursuant to Section 203 (a) of the Tax Law. In 1949 the
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 688, § 24.
8. Supra note 1 at 236, 203 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1960).
9. Ibid.
1O. Ibid.
ii. Supra notes 4 and 5.
12. 1913 Attorney General, Vol. 11, 252-256.
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directors of the corporation distributed substantially all of the assets of the
dissolved corporation. Nine-years later petitioners, representatives of deceased
shareholders, brought this proceeding pursuant Section 106 of the Stock Cor-
poration Law for an accounting. They alleged that the final distribution of
the corporate assets was illegal because it was made without regard to the
shareholders contributions and that shareholders received a disproportionate
share of the assets.
The trial court in In re Baldwin Trading Corporation5 dismissed the
petition on the grounds that the proceeding was in essence "by or on behalf"
of the corporation and therefore the six-year period of limitation under Sec-
tion 48(8) of the New York Civil Practice Act applied. The Appellate Division
reversed,14 holding that the directors of a dissolved corporation are trustees
for the purpose of liquidating the corporation, and the Statute of Limitations
does not begin to run until the trust is terminated or until the trust is repu-
diated or denied. Therefore, the ten-year period under Section 53 of the New
York Civil Practice Act is applicable. The Court of Appeals held the ten-year
period applied.15 Three of the judges held that the directors of a dissolved
corporation are not trustees of an express trust. They do, however, occupy a
position of fiduciary responsibility and should be held to the same standards
of trust as applies to other fiduciaries. Judge Desmond in a concurring opinion
agreed with the majority opinion of the Appellate Division, that directors of a
dissolved corporation are in fact trustees. The three dissenting judges agreed
in substance with the trial court's opinion that this was an action derivative in
nature brought by or on behalf of the corporation and is limited to a six-year
period under Section 48(8). Their contention being that the petitioners should
not be allowed to enlarge this period by electing to proceed in equity, when an
action at law has already been barred.
The various opinions present two distinct problems. First, should the
directors of a dissolved corporation be considered trustees of an express trust?
Second, must a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 106 of the Stock
Corporation Law be necessarily one by or on behalf of the corporation or may
it be one in the right of the individual shareholder? In numerous decisions
directors of a dissolved corporation have been referred to as trustees. How-
ever, in most of these cases the court relied on Section 29 of the General Cor-
poration Law which expressly referred to the directors as trustees. In 1932,
Section 29 was amended and the word trustees was removed.' 6 "The legislative
memoranda discloses that the purpose was to prevent a change of status then
existing between directors of a going corporation and those in dissolution." 17
It is clear that the directors of a functioning corporation are not trustees for
13. 2 Misc. 2d 698, 151 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
14. 8 A.D.2d 968, 190 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1959).
15. 8 N.Y.2d 144, 202 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1960).
16. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 29.
17. Supra note 15 at 148, 202 N.Y.S2d 314 (1960).
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the stockholders. That is, they are not trustees of an express trust as to which
the statute of limitations does not run. They do, however, owe a fiduciary
duty to the stockholders and courts of equity have held them to the same
standards of trust as apply to other fiduciaries.' 8 Therefore, to give effect to
this legislative declaration the directors of a dissolved corporation should be
held to the same standards.
In order to answer the second question it is necessary to characterize the
cause of action as individual or dervative in nature. Section 106 of the Stock
Corporation Law does not provide a period of limitation. This does not mean
that no period is applicable, but that the provisions of the New York Civil
Practice Act applies. Section 48(8) of the New York Civil Practice Act pro-
vides a six-year period for all actions in law or in equity, and provides that
they both be treated under the same section. However, this Section does not
include actions by individual shareholders brought in their own right against
the directors. In the instant case the wrong alleged by the petitioners is that
the shares were not ratably distributed. This is not an injury to the cor-
poration but one to the individual shareholders. "It is obvious that wrongful
acts by directors or other managers, may result in direct injuries to individual
shareholder, entitling the latter to sue for their own benefit.' 9 If this action
is characterized as an individual cause of action, as it should be, then the
appropriate period of limitations is ten years as provided by Section 53 of the
New York Civil Practice Act.
The dissent argues that since there was an adequate remedy at law the
choice to proceed in equity cannot enlarge the period of limitations.2 0 However,
it is difficult to see how the cause of action could be described as derivative in
nature. The complaint does not allege a wrongful liquidation but the failure
to ratably distribute. Although the complaint prayed that the relief be given
to the corporation, the object of the action is to recover upon a chose in action
belonging to the shareholders, not to compel the directors to perform a duty
they owe to the corporation.
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT WILL NOT PREVENT APPLICATION OF REAL PROPERTY
TAX LAW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Once a petition for a corporate reorganization proceeding under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act 1 is approved, the Federal Court obtains exclusive
jurisdiction over the debtor's property and no other court has the power to
18. 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations § 1301 (1947).
19. Baker and Cary, Corporations 599 (3d ed. 1959).
20. Keys v. Leopold, 241 N.Y. 189, 149 N.E. 82S (1925).
1. 11 US.C. § 501 et seq.
